Zardari had just flown on a trip to the US in order to meet with his Afghan counterpart Karzai and forge a regional co-operation deal. No doubt most of the Pakistanis were embarrassed by his conduct there and his un-presidential demeanour which made most of us hang our heads in shame. What is remarkable however, is that the US seems to have grabbed on to yet another weak leader to support and prop up inside Pakistan in order to carry forward their regional objectives.
Musharraf is now gone, thanks to a vocal democratic movement that refused to side with him in-spite of the blatant US support for the dictator. But after he left, a fluke of politics landed Mr. Zardari in the presidential hot-seat — the most un-likely and ill-suited man for the job. A person who had almost no prior political experience and had been famous in Pakistan and the world over as Mr. 10% for his corrupt practices. For a time people were willing to give him a chance. They let him continue in his first 100 days, then second 100 days waiting for him to deliver the promises of Benazir’s campaign (who’s flag he claimed to uphold). Those promises were never fulfilled. Zardari seemed to have started revelling more and more in the limelight and those promises became increasingly un-important to him — something he could put off or just make another lame excuse about. Interestingly however, he miscalculated the post-Musharraf era “enlightenment” that had come to the masses since the last Pakistani democratic era. The people were more attuned to his delaying tactics and read through him. Impatience generally grew till it reached a boiling point over the issue of the restoration of Judges and culminated in a long march up to the capital, which was supported by all non-PPP political parties and the population in general.
Zardari was literally brought to his knees while in office and lost face with the general population. TV stations, political commentators, columnists, other members of society who were willing to give him more time and space to deliver earlier on, openly started with their criticism of his government. And rightly so. Now the overwhelming opinion of the public had turned against his being in power. A poll by the American Republican Institute (and various other polls) showed just 16% of the population in support of Zardari — a poll for which they were asked to pack up their bags and leave from Pakistan. Even key members of the PPP also resigned from his government.
Currently, Zardari’s approval ratings remain so low that he has to resort to parading around his son Bilawal so he can help him maintain support of some Bhutto loyalists. Bilawal is brought out in every key event and every key visit. Even in an international visit to the US, Bilawal was taken along in no capacity to represent Zardari’s connection to the Bhutto clan — further emphasizing the weakness of his presidency. Zardari, like Musharraf, now also feels an urgent need to pander to all US demands so they can help prop him up. And the US has taken up his issue.
Just like they made a major blunder with supporting Musharraf against the wishes of the people of Pakistan, the US seems to be headed down the exact same path yet again. Obama was clever enough to realize Zardari’s lame status in the country and the weakness of his government, however, Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, has found in him a trustable partner who can get some healthy gains for his mission in the region. Somebody who would always lean on the US throughout his term in order to prop him up, and somebody unfortunately in a powerful position in Pakistan who can get the Americans their objectives.
Where will this alliance get us? It can only be a matter of learned speculation. The public does not support Zardari very much. This is clear as crystal. He is a guy who has a reputation for his corrupt practices and cronyism. Somebody who has just been able to come to power due to a sweeping National Re-conciliation Ordinance issued by a dying dictator in order to gain him some post-term security in the Pakistani political jungle. What we the Pakistanis can expect now is more of the same. The country will be flooded with billions of dollars in aid. However most of it will likely be ending up in politicians pockets (kudos to a party in power with a history of corruption). A fraction of this aid will go towards photo-op schemes in order to show the world that something is being done. However the spend-efficiency of all the aid coming to Pakistan is expected to be extremely low. For every dollar of aid given, 50 cents can be expected to go down an un-known black-hole unless stringent controls are maintained on its spending. Zardari will also keep kow-towing the US line un-mindful of the Pakistani public viewpoint, in order to help keep his presidency alive. Meanwhile, public resentment against his government will keep simmering. In consequence, anti-American sentiment in Pakistan would possibly grow further and increase for the next four years that Zardari remains in power.
For the world powers trying to help Pakistan come out of the mess it is in, there is still time to rethink their strategy. Is the current course the right one to follow?
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